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COMMENTS

Rethinking Regulatory Takings: A View
Toward a Comprehensive Analysis
The United States Constitution guarantees that no private property shall be taken without just compensation.' Most state constitu-

tions have similar, and oftentimes broader, provisions which mirror

or expand this concept. 2 A governmental body may be held liable
1. "No person shall be . .. deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
"IN]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Although the fourteenth amendment does not specifically prohibit taking without
just compensation, the provisions recited in the fifth amendment regarding "takings"
have been made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980); Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
2. ALA. CONST., art. I, § 24 ("[B]ut private property shall not be taken or
applied for public use, unless just compensation be first made therefor.. ."); ALASKA
CONST., art. 1, § 18 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation."); Aiuz. CO NST., art. 2, § 17 ("No private property shall
be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation having first
been made ... Whenever an attempt is made to take private property for a use
alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be really public shall
be a judicial question, and determined as such without regard to any legislative
assertion that the use is public."); ARK. Co NST., art. 2, § 22 ("The right of property
is before and higher than any constitutional sanction; and private property shall not
be taken, appropriated or damaged for public use, without just compensation
therefor."); CAL. CONST., art. 1, § 19 ("Private property may be taken or damaged
for public use only when just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has
first been paid to, or into court for, the owner."); CoLo. CONST., art. III, § 15
("Private property shall not be taken or damaged, for public or private use, without
just compensation."); CONN. CONST., art. I, § II("The property of no person shall
be taken for public use, without just compensation therefor."); DEL. CONST., art. I,
§ 8 ("[Ior shall any man's property be taken or applied to public use without the
consent of his representatives, and without compensation being made."); FLA. CONST.,
art. 16, § 29 ("No private property, nor right of way shall be appropriated to the
use of any corporation or individual until full compensation therefor shall be first
made to the owner . . .; which compensation . . . shall be ascertained by twelve (12)
jurors in a court of competent jurisdiction, as shall be prescribed by law."); GA.
CONST., art. 1, § 3, 1 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
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both when it expressly asserts dominion over a piece of property for
purposes without just and adequate compensation being first paid."); HAW. CONST.,
art. 1, § 20 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without
just compensation."); IDAHO CONST., art. 1, § 14 ("Private property may be taken
for public use, but not until a just compensation, to be ascertained in the manner
prescribed by law, shall be paid therefor."); ILL. CONST., art. I, § 15 ("[P]rivate
property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation as
provided by law."); IND. CONST., art. 1, § 21 ("No man's property shall be taken
by law, without just compensation; nor, except in case of the State, without such
compensation first assessed and tendered."); IOWA CONST., art. 1, § 18 ("Private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation first being
made, or secured to be made to the owner thereof, as soon as the damages shall be
assessed by a jury, who shall not take into consideration and advantages that may
result to said owner on account of the improvement for which it is taken."); KAN.
CONST., art. 12, § 4 (The only reference in the Kansas Constitution to eminent
domain deals with the ability of a corporation to appropriate private property: "No
right of way shall be appropriated to the use of any corporation, until full compensation therefor be first made in money, or secured by a deposit of money, to the
owner, irrespective of any benefit from any improvement proposed by such corporation."); Ky. CONST., § 13 ("[N]or shall any man's property be taken or applied to
public use without the consent of his representatives, and without just compensation
being preyiously made to him."); LA. CONST., art. 1, § 4 ("Property shall not be
taken or damaged by the state or its political subdivisions except for public purposes
and with just compensation paid to the owner or into court for his benefit."); ME.
CONST., art. 1, § 21 ("Private property shall not be taken for public uses without
just compensation; nor unless the public exigencies require it."); MD. CONST., art.
III, § 40 ("The General Assembly shall enact no law authorizing private property, to
be taken for public use, without just compensation, as agreed upon between the
parties, or awarded by a Jury, being first paid or tendered to the party entitled to
such compensation."); MAss. CONST., pt. 1, art. 10, § 11 ("[N]o part of the property
of any individual can, with justice, be taken from him, or applied to public uses,
without his own consent, or that of the representative body of the people. . . . And
whenever the public exigencies require that the property of any individual should be
appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation therefore.");
MICH. CONST., art. 10, § 2 ("Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation therefore being first made or secured in a manner
prescribed by law."); MINN. CONST., art. 1, § 13 ("Private property shall not be
taken, destroyed or damaged for public use without just compensation therefor, first
paid or secured."); Miss. CONST., art. 3, § 17 ("Private property shall not be taken
or damaged for public use, except on due compensation being first made to the
owner or owners thereof, in a manner to be prescribed by law; and whenever an
attempt is made to take private property for a use alleged to be public, the question
whether the contemplated use be public shall be a judicial question, and, as such,
determined without regard to legislative assertion that the use is public."); Mo.
CONST., art. 1, § 26 ("That private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation."); MONT. CONST., art. 2, § 29 ("Private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation to the full
extent of the loss having been first made to or paid into court for the owner.");
NEv. CONST., art. 1, § 8 ("IN]or shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation having been first made, or secured, except in cases of
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public use (eminent domain) 3 and when it effectuates a substantial
limitation on the use of a piece of property through zoning or other
war, riot, fire, or great public peril, in which case compensation shall be afterward
made."); N.H. CONST., Pt. 1 (first), art. 12 ("But no part of a man's property shall
be taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that of
the representative body of the people."). For the proposition that compensation must
be paid for a taking, see, e.g., Crosby v. Hanover, 36 N.H. 404 (1858); Great Falls
Manufacturing Co. v. Fernald, 47 N.H. 44 (1867); N.J. CONST., art. I, 20 ("Private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."); N.M.
CONST., art. III, § 20 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation."); N.Y. CONST., art. 1, § 7 ("Private property shall

not be taken for public use without just compensation."); N.C. CONST., art. I, § 19
("No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or
privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or
property, but by the law of the land." This section is held to stand for the proposition
that no person may be depriyed of his property except by his own consent, or by the
law of the land, i.e., except by due process of law. See Eason v. Spence, 232 N.C.
579, 61 S.E.2d 717 (1950); Parker v. Stewart, 29 N.C. App. 747, 225 S.E.2d 632
(1976)).; N.D. CONST., art. I, § 16 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation having been first made to, or paid into
court for the owner."); Omo CONST., art. I, § 19 ("Private property shall ever be
held inviolate, but subservient to the public welfare. When taken in time of war or
other public exigency, imperatively requiring its immediate seizure or for the purpose
of making or repairing roads, which shall be open to the public, without charge, a
compensation shall be made to the owner, in money, and in all other cases, where
private property shall be taken for public use, a compensation therefor shall first be

made in money, or first secured by a deposit of money.

. ."); OKLA. CONST.,

art. 2,

§ 24 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation."); OR. CONST., art. I, § 18 and art. XI, § 4; PA. CONST., art. 1, §
10; R.I. CONST., art. 1, § 16 ("Private property shall not be taken for public uses,
without just compensation."); S.C. CONST., art. I, § 13 ("Except as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, private property shall not be taken for private use
without the consent of the owner, nor for public use without just compensation being
first made therefore.") (amended 1971); S.D. CONST., art. VI, § 13 ("Private property
shall not be taken for public use, or damage, without just compensation . .. ");
TENN. CONSt., art. 1, § 21 ("That io man's particular services shall be demanded,
or property taken, or applied to public use, without the consent of his representatives,
or without just compensation being made therefor."); TEx. CONST., art. 1, § 17 ("No
person's property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use
without adequate compensation being made, unless by the consent of such person;
and, when taken, except for the use of the State, such compensation shall be first
made . . ."); UTAH CONST., art. I, § 22 ("Private property shall not be taken or

damaged for public use without just compensation.");

VA.

CONST., ch. I, art. 2

("That private property ought to be subservient to public uses when necessity requires

it, nevertheless, whenever any person's property is taken for the use of the public,
the owner ought to receive an equivalent in money."); VA. CONST., art. I, § 11 ("nor
any law whereby private property shall be taken or damaged for public uses, without
just compensation, the term 'public uses' to be defined by the General Assembly
. . ."); WASH. CONST., art. 1, § 16 ("No private property shall be taken or damaged
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regulation (regulatory taking). 4 In direct conflict with these constitutional guarantees are the ongoing and increasingly expansive attempts
by government to regulate the use and development of private property.5
While any regulatory activity impinges to some extent on private
property rights, not every zoning or regulatory activity constitutes an
for public or private use without just compensation having been first made ...
Whenever an attempt is made to take private property for a use alleged to be public,
the question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question,
and determined as such without regard to any legislative assertion that the use is
public."); W. VA. CONST., art. 3, § 9 ("Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use, without just compensation.. ."); Wis. CoNST., art. 1, § 13
("The property of no person shall be taken for public use without just compensation
therefor."); WYo. CONsT., art. 1, § 33 ("Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public or private use without just compensation.").
3. Eminent domain is the power of the sovereign to take property for
public use without the owner's consent... It must be admitted, despite the
logical accuracy of the foregoing definition and despite the fact that the
payment of compensation is not an essential element of the meaning of
eminent domain, that it is an essential element of the valid exercise of such
power.
NICHOLS ON EMINENT DoMAiN, NATURE

AND ORIGIN OF POWER,

pp. 1-7 to 1-9 (3d ed.

1985) (emphasis added). See also Scott v. Toledo, 36 F. 385 (1888).
"The right of eminent domain is the right of the state, or those delegated by the
state or otherwise acquiring such power, to reassert, whether temporarily or permanently, its dominion over any portion of the soil of the state on account of public
exigency and for the public good." Kelty, Eminent Domain, Illinois Municipal Law
(Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education, Stewart Diamond, gen. ed.) vol. 2,
ch. 22, p. 22-4 (1974).
4. The phrase 'inverse condemnation' generally describes a cause of action
against a 'government defendant in which a landowner may recover just
compensation for a 'taking' of his property under the Fifth Amendment,
even though formal condemnation proceedings in exercise of the sovereign's
power of eminent domain have not been instituted by the government entity.
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 n.2 (1980).
5. At an earlier point in history, a landowner's use and disposition of his
property was viewed as an activity wholly within the discretion of the landowner.
See, e.g., II W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (describing
"the right of property ... [as] .

.

.that sole and despotic dominion which one man

claims and exercises over the eternal things of the world, in total exclusion of the
right of any other individual in the universe." (emphasis added)).

Today, however, a landowner's use of his property is seen as inextricably meshed

with bordering and nearby property uses, as well as broader social concerns. These

different uses are interrelated and are often conflicting in nature and in application.
See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). While this
initial case upholding comprehensive zoning as constitutional was actually a city's
attempt at "snob zoning," regardless of the motive, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the city's action as a valid exercise of the police power.
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actionable regulatory taking. 6 Whether the government action is express or implied, the following factors must be present for compensation, or some other form of relief, to be granted to a property
owner: (1) a taking of private property which is (2) without the
owner's consent. 7 In the case of eminent domain, there is the additional limitation on the governmental action that the acquisition be
for a public use. 8
Last term, the United States Supreme Court decided FirstEnglish
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles. 9
The FirstEnglish Church case finally decided that "the Just Compensation Clause requires the government to pay for 'temporary' regulatory takings."' 1 However, in that same decision, Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, left open the critical question of "whether
the county might avoid the conclusion that a compensable taking had
occurred by establishing that the denial of all use was insulated as a
part of the State's authority to. enact safety regulations. '""I This
language clearly refers to the state's police power under the fourteenth
amendment to legislate for the protection of the "health, safety,
morals and general welfare" of the community. 12
6. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (The Court, in First
English Evangelical Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, stated that "in
Agins, we concluded that the preliminary activity did not work a taking." 107 S.Ct.
2378, 2388-89 (1987).).
7. 1 NicHoLs ON EMINENT DOMAIN, NATURE AND ORIGIN OF POWER, pp. 1-7
to 1-8 (3d ed. 1985). See also supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
8. Id. Each one of these requirements has been the subject of considerable
controversy, litigation and academic interest. See, e.g., Berger, A Policy Analysis of
the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 165 (1974); B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE CONsTITUrION (1977); Michelman, Property, Utility andFairness: Comments
on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HA~v. L. REV. 1165
(1967); Sterk, Government Liability for UnconstitutionalLand Use Regulation, 60
IND. L.J. 113 (1984); Cunningham, Inverse Condemnation as a Remedy for "Regulatory Takings" 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 517 (1981); Costonis, Presumptive and Per
Se Takings: A decisional Model for the taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U.L. REv. 465 (1983);
Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Stoebuck, Police Power,
Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057 (1980).
9. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
10. Id. at 2385.
11. Id. at 2384-85.
12. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). Justice Rehnquist's
opinion in First English Church cites to three fourteenth amendment cases in support
of the proposition that an otherwise compensable event may be saved by the "State's
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These references to the fourteenth amendment police power raise
some important fundamental questions about the analysis which the
Court has adopted in regulatory taking cases, including its ability to
adequately deal with the constitutional and public policy questions at
issue. There appears to be a need for an analysis which incorporates
both fifth and fourteenth amendment concerns. This Comment explores the various approaches which have been suggested by the United
States Supreme Court in its attempts to clarify this area of constitutional law, 3 and concludes that a modified fourteenth amendment
analysis should be employed by all courts in regulatory taking cases.
Part I will survey the two dominant theories and analyses which have
been employed in local land use regulation cases. The first theory is
a substantive due process/police power analysis, and the second is a
fifth amendment just compensation clause analysis. Part II will look
at some of the United States Supreme Court's more recent approaches
to the regulatory taking and compensation issues by focusing on the
Court's decisions in Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City of New
York, 4 Agins v. City of Tiburon,5 and First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles. 16 Part III
outlines the current analytical framework within which regulatory
taking cases are being decided, and Part IV recommends a modified
fourteenth amendment alternative to the current federal analysis.
I.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND FIFTH AMENDMENT JUST

COMPENSATION CLAUSE:

A.

Two

HISTORICALLY DOMINANT THEORIES

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

One approach which may be followed in dealing with an alleged
"regulatory taking" is a substantive due process test which focuses
on the objectives of a zoning ordinance. This analysis can be broken
down into two distinct parts: First, it is necessary to determine whether
the objectives of the local ordinance are a valid exercise of the police
power as defined by the federal courts,' 7 and that the means employed
authority to enact safety regulations." First English Church, 107 S. Ct. at 2385 citing

Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 394 (1962); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
13. See infra notes 17-57 and accompanying text.
14. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).

15. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
16. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
17. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). See also infra note 21
and accompanying text.
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to effect that proper objective are rationally related to that objective.18
Second, it is necessary to assess whether the municipality's action
complies with the state's enabling legislation19 as defined by the state
courts .20
In the federal arena, the judicial standard of review for a valid
exercise of the police power, which defines the extent of the permissible activity under the state's general police power, asks whether the
challenged regulation is "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having
no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare."21 If this initial test is not satisfied, the questioned regulation
will be invalidated on the grounds that it is "arbitrary," "capricious,"
'unreasonable" or "not substantially related to the
public health,
safety, morals or general welfare.' '22 The critically important decision
regarding the validity of zoning regulation was handed down in 1926,
in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 23 The Euclid decision held
that "before [a zoning] ordinance can be declared unconstitutional,"
the provisions of the ordinance must be "clearly arbitrary and unrea-

sonable. "2

At the time of Euclid, the extent of permissible activity based on
the police power was narrower than it is today. 25 However, even under
this narrower definition of the police power, the courts generally
deferred to local legislative judgments regarding the harmfulness of
particular zoning uses. 26 One example of this more narrowly defined
police power came two years after Euclid, in Nectow v. City of
Cambridge,27 where the Court held that when a zoning ordinance
18. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).

19. See Cunningham, Land-Use Control - The State and Local Programs, 50

IowA L. REV. 367, 369 n.3 (1965) (collection of state enabling acts which
empower

municipal, county and township zoning for all 50 states and the District of Columbia).
20. See infra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
21. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). See also Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
22. 272 U.S. at 395.
23. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
24. Id. at 395.
25. Compare, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), with
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).

26. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 420 (1922)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman
V.
City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660-61
(1887).
27. 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (general zoning ordinance was held not to advance
health, safety, convenience and general welfare as applied to this specific tract given
the general character of existing uses in the area).
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unreasonably applies to a specific tract of property, the ordinance

constitutes a violation of the fourteenth amendment and must be
invalidated. 28 The Nectow case, however, was the last time the Supreme Court invalidated a zoning ordinance on the grounds that it

exceeded the police power.

As a result of the "liberalizing" of the state's general police
power, 29 the primary responsibility for defining the legitimate objectives of the zoning power seems to have fallen on the state courts.

Generally, state courts define legitimate objectives by interpreting
their state's zoning enabling legislation.30 While a state's enabling
statute will likely follow the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act
language, 3 allowing zoning "[flor the purpose of promoting health,
safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community,

32

the state

courts have often interpreted their respective zoning enabling acts

liberally in light of the federal courts' expansion of the police power.33
Independent of the federal courts' treatment of the police power
are the state courts' interpretations of the terms "health, safety,
morals, and general welfare." Those terms, on their face, are so
28. Id. at 187-189.
29. In Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), the Court held that "[tlhe concept
of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it [land use regulations]
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary." Id. at 33.
Twenty years later, in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), Mr. Justice
Douglas, writing for the Court, states that:
[a] quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles
restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family
needs. This goal is a permissible one within Berman v. Parker ... The

police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy
places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and
the blessings of quiet seclusion and clear air make the area a sanctuary for
people.
Id. at 9.
30. See supra note 19.

31. The STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT was originally drafted as a
model act by the U.S. Department of Commerce in 1926 under Herbert H. Hoover.
The Standard Act has been adopted at some point by all 50 states and is still
currently in effect (sometimes with modifications) in 47 states. See 1 WILLIAMS,
AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW, § 18.01, at 355 (1974). For a breakdown of the
particular provisions of each state's enabling statute, see id. at 361-370.

32. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § I.
33. See, e.g., National Used Cars, Inc. v. City of Kalamazoo, 61 Mich. App.
520, 523-24, 233 N.W.2d 64, 66-67 (1975); Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Or. 35, 4647, 400 P.2d 255, 261-62 (1965). For a discussion of different historical "stages"
that state land use control has gone through, see Williams, And Now We Have Four
Systems -, 12 VT. L. REv. 1 (1987).
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vague and general as to provide little in the way of limitations on the
zoning power, and little in the way of guidance as to the application

of any limits those terms might impose on a municipality's zoning
power.

Traditionally, zoning dealt primarily with height,3" setback, 35 lot

size, 36

floor space,3 7 and use restrictions. 3 These restrictions were all
sufficiently related to "health" and "safety" objectives (as those

terms are commonly understood) to sustain them solely on those

grounds. However, more recently, courts have increasingly relied on
"general welfare" as an independent ground for upholding local
39
zoning ordinances.

It is reasonably clear that without more, the police power analysis,
as it is currently formulated, imposes little meaningful limitation on

the zoning power of a municipality. It therefore gives little guidance
to the local legislator and little protection to the property owner

against municipal abuses of power.

B. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT "TAKINGS CLAUSE"

While the substantive due process/police power analysis could

theoretically provide a complete analysis with respect to a challenged

land use regulation, 40 the substantive due process analysis is only the

threshold test for the validity of a zoning regulation challenge under

the fifth amendment. Even if a zoning regulation has been held to
have a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or
general welfare, it may still violate the takings clause of the fifth

34. See, e.g., Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 373, 79 N.E. 745, 745-46 (1907),
aff'd, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
35. See, e.g., Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 609 (1927).
36. See, e.g., Flora Realty & Investment Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025,
1040-41, 246 S.W.2d 771, 779, appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 802 (1952); Simon v.
Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 563, 42 N.E.2d 516, 517-18 (1942).
37. See, e.g., Linshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 173,
89 A.2d 693, 697 (1952).
38. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391, 394
(1926) (uses separated in order to alleviate odors, noise, etc., from industrial
development in a residential area and to reduce overcrowding, traffic congestion and
provide recreational spaces in order to protect safety and well-being of children).
39. See Elbert v. Village of North Hills, 28 N.Y.S.2d 317, rev'd on other
grounds, 262 A.D. 856, 26 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1941); City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo,
Inc. 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964). For federal cases relying on an extended
notion of the general welfare concept, see supra note 29.
40. See supra notes 17-39 and accompanying text.
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amendment. 41 Numerous judicial and academic attempts to interpret
the takings clause have produced only chronic confusion. The courts
have failed to articulate any test providing analytical and practical
consistency, as well as failing to address the public policy concerns of
42
municipalities and property owners alike.

Early court decisions addressing land use regulations 43 seem to

suggest that where a regulation was a proper exercise of the police
power, there was no taking." Where a particular regulation exceeded
the limits of the police power, there was still no fifth amendment
taking; rather, the regulation was subject to invalidation as violative
45
of the fourteenth amendment.

From an historical perspective, the first critical decision in this

area was Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.46 In this 1922 opinion,

41. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the dichotomy between the substantive due process analysis and any fifth amendment taking question. See, e.g.,
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-63 (1980). Some states, however, have
"merged" the discussion of substantive due process with the takings issue. See, e.g.,
LaSalle National Bank v. County of Cook, 12 I11.2d 40, 46-47, 145 N.E.2d 65, 69
(1965) (five of the six elements identified by the Illinois Supreme Court are straight
substantive due process factors, and one of the factors is a fifth amendment takingstype inquiry).
42. See, e.g., Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 123-24 (1978). For an excellent commentary on why the takings clause may have
caused (and continues to cause) so much confusion and trouble, see Rose, Mahon
Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CALrF. L. REV. 561
(1984). See also Dunham, Griggs v. Alleghany County in Perspective: 30 Years of
Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63.
43. The earliest cases were based on the notion that once a challenged regulation
passed constitutional muster regarding the valid exercise of the police power, the
inquiry had ended. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898). In Holden, the Court
stated that while
the police power cannot be put forward as an excuse for oppressive and
unjust legislation, it may be lawfully resorted to for the purposes of
preserving the public health, safety or morals, or the abatement of public
nuisances, and a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to
determine, not only what the interests of the public require, -but what means
are necessary for the protection of such interests.
Id. at 392. See also L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587, 597-600 (1900); Fertilizing
Company v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 666-70 (1878); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113,
126 (1876).
44. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. City of Little

Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
45. Although a post-Mahon case, see e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277
U.S. 183 (1928).
46. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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Justice Holmes first articulated the "diminution-of-value" test. 47 The
Pennsylvania Coal test states that when the diminution in "values
incident to property . . . reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not
all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the [governmental]act.' '48 Further, the Court asserted
that "if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. ' 49
The Court, however, did not identify what standard would be applied
to determine when a regulation had "gone too far" so as to constitute
a "taking." 5 0

47. The "diminution of value" test, simply stated, is that when the diminution
of the value of a piece of property, due to government regulation or activity, reaches
a "certain magnitude," the government will be forced to institute eminent domain
proceedings and pay just compensation in order to acquire the property. See id. at
413. An important point needs to be clarified regarding Justice Holmes' "diminution
of value" test: in Justice Holmes' test, when the "diminution" reaches that "certain
magnitude" referred to, the government is forced to acquire the property. This can
be distinguished from Justice Brennan's "regulatory taking" concept in his dissent
in San Diego Gas & Electric, where there is no "court-imposed" eminent domain
proceeding; rather, Justice Brennan's concept would involve the payment of damages
to the extent that there is a taking. This would include payment for the diminished
value of the land due to the regulation, as well as "temporary taking" damages for
the time an "excessive" ordinance (i.e., one that effects an unconstitutional "taking")
is in effect. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 653 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The major
difference, then, is that Justice Holmes' test uses "diminution of value" to determine
whether there has been a taking at all, and Justice Brennan's test uses a "diminution
of value" concept to determine the amount of damages. See id. at 653-61 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
48. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
49. Id. The majority opinion did recognize, however, that a legitimate exercise
of the police power could ". . . to some extent [diminish] values incident to
property. . ." without having to compensate the property owner, otherwise .
[gjovernment could hardly go on..." Id. at 413.
50. In Mahon the coal company had owned all the property in question and
later deeded away the surface rights, expressly reserving to the coal company the
right to remove all the coal beneath the surface. In addition, the deed expressly stated
that the grantees assumed the risk and waived any and all claims against the coal
company which might arise due to the sub-surface coal mining operation. This deed
was executed in 1878.
Thereafter, on May 27, 1921, the Pennsylvania legislature
passed P.L. 1198,
commonly referred to as the Kohler Act. Section 1 of the Act provided, in pertinent
part, that it shall be unlawful ". . . so to conduct the operation of mining anthracite
coal as to cause the caving-in, collapse, or subsidence of... (d) any dwelling or other
structure used as a human habitation. . ." Id. at 393-394 n.l.
Section 8 of the Act stated that "[tihe courts of common pleas shall have power
to award injunctions to restrain violations of this act." Id. at 394 n.l.
The Mahons were residential property owners whose surface property rights were
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After Pennsylvania Coal, the fifth/fourteenth amendment issue

took on new significance and added dimensions, as Justice Holmes'
"diminution-of-value" test became the focal point for the modern

view of regulatory takings. There is some academic debate, with more

than mere academic importance, about whether Justice Holmes was
actually referring to a regulatory taking in the modern sense, or
whether he was referring to taking "metaphorically" as the necessity
of a governmental unit to resort to eminent domain proceedings or
face judicial invalidation of the regulatory act."
The meaning ascribed to the word "taking" in the Pennsylvania
Coal decision might be determinative of whether regulatory takings
can be analyzed under the fourteenth amendment substantive due
process/police power analysis, or whether the Constitution necessitates

a fifth amendment just compensation clause analysis.

52
In Fred F. French Investing Co., Inc. v. City of New York
Chief Judge Breitel suggested that:
[Miany cases have equated an invalid exercise of the regulating
zoning power, perhaps only metaphorically, with a 'taking' or

being threatened by the coal mining operation. Although they had purchased their
property with the covenants allowing sub-surface coal mining, they sought an
injunction prohibiting sub-surface mining which threatened their property in violation
of the Kohler Act.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, holding that
the Kohler Act prohibition exceeded the police powers and therefore violated the
rights of the Pennsylvania Coal Co. as owners of the sub-surface mining rights.
Using his "diminution of value" test, Justice Holmes states that "[wihat makes the
right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised with profit. To make it
commercially impractical to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for
constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it. This we think that we are
warranted in assuming that the statute does." Id. at 414-415.
The Court does not, however, determine how much or what percentage of the
company's coal would have to be left in the ground as a result of the statute; what
the value of the coal is; or any comparison of the value of the restricted coal to the
value of the coal which can be mined.
Justice Brandeis, dissenting, suggested that it was not sufficient to compare only
the value of the mineable coal versus the restricted coal, but rather ".

. .[i]f

we are

to consider the value of the coal kept in place by the restriction, we should compare
it with the value... not of the coal alone, but with the value of the whole property."
Id. at 419.
51. Compare Fred F. French Investing Co., Inc. v. City of New York, 39
N.Y.2d 587, 594, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 8-9, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385, appeal dismissed, 429
U.S. 990 (1976) with San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S.
621, 653 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
52. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 350 N.E.2d 381, appeal dismissed, 429
U.S. 990 (1976).
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a 'confiscation' of property, terminology appropriate to the
eminent domain power and the concomitant right to compensation when it is exercised .... [I]n power and not an eminent
domain case, Mr. Justice Holmes stated: . . . if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking . . . . The
metaphor should not be confused with the reality. Close
examination of the cases reveal that in none of them, anymore
than in the PennsylvaniaCoal case (supra), was there an actual
'taking' under the eminent domain power, despite the use of
the terms 'taking' or 'confiscatory.' Instead, in each the
gravamen of the constitutional challenge to the regulatory
measure was that it was an invalid exercise of the police power
under the due process clause, and the cases were decided under
that rubric.3
This view may be contrasted with that of Justice Brennan, when
he suggested in his dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City
of San Diego that "once a court establishes that there was a regulatory
'taking,' the Constitution demands that the government entity pay
just compensation for the period commencing on the date the regulation first effected the 'taking,' and ending on the date the government entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regulation."14
It is instructive to note that while the Court in Pennsylvania Coal
held the statute to be a "taking," the remedy provided by the Court
was invalidation of the statute-not monetary compensation. This
clearly demonstrates that Justice Holmes used the term "taking"
metaphorically-in the narrow legal context. 5 While it is difficult, if
not impossible, to objectively determine the "true" meaning of Justice
Holmes' opinion, the most logical conclusion seems to be that the
opinion did not stand for the proposition that an overburdening
regulation required compensation where there were no eminent domain proceedings.16 Unfortunately, however, Justice Holmes' opinion
53. Id. at 594, N.Y.S.2d at 8-9, 350 N.E.2d at 385 (emphasis added).

54. 450 U.S. 621, 653 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also, B.

& J.

BANTA,

THE TAKING

AcKERMAN,

235 n.2 (1977); F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES
ISSUE 105-38 (Study for the Council on Environmental

PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION

Quality, 1973).
55. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412-16.
56. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). See also Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1192,
1232-22 (1967).
It is instructive to note that while the Court in Mahon held the statute to be a
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in Pennsylvania Coal seems to serve as the cornerstone of a Supreme

Court doctrine which holds that compensation is available in a

regulatory setting Where no eminent domain proceedings are applica57
ble.
A closer look at three Supreme Court cases will be useful to outline
the current state of the fifth amendment "regulatory taking" analysis,
as well as to highlight some of the most conceptually and practically

problematic areas for the Court.
II.
A.

RECENT CASES

PENN CENTRAL TRANSPORTATION CO. v. CITY OFNEW YORK 58

In Penn Central, Grand Central Terminal was designated a
landmark on August 2, 1967,19 pursuant to New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law (hereinafter Landmark Law). 60 The New

"taking," the remedy provided by the Court was invalidation of the statute-not
monetary compensation. This clearly demonstrates that Justice Holmes used the term
"taking" metaphorically-in the narrow legal context. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 41216.
57. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County
of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2386 (1987); San Diego Gas & Electric v. City of
San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 653-54, 660-61 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127-28, 130-31
(1978).
58. 438 U.S. 104 (1978);
59. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0 et. seq. (1976).
60. The New York ordinance included a number of special features for the
landmark designation process which merit notation. The primary responsibility for
the administration of the Landmarks Preservation Law is granted to an 11-member
Landmarks Preservation Commission [hereinafter the Commission].
N.Y.C. CHARTER, § 534 (1976). The first step in the process is accomplished
solely by the Commission and involves the identification of potential landmark sites,
the holding of public hearings to give interested parties an opportunity to be heard,
and the initial designation as a landmark. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A, § 207-1.0.
The second step in the process is a review of the initial designation by the New
York City Board of Estimate. After review, the Board of Estimate may approve,
modify, or disapprove the designation. Id. at § 207-2.0. The final step in the process
allows for judicial review of the designation.
Once there is a final designation, the law imposes two distinct burdens on the
property owner: first, the property owner must maintain the exterior features of the

building in "good repair." Id. at § 207-10.0(a); second, the property owner must
obtain approval of the Commission to do any exterior architectural alterations or
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York City Board of Estimate confirmed the designation on September
21, 1967.61

In 1968, the Penn Central Transportation Co. 62 presented to the

Landmarks Preservation Commission (hereinafter Commission) two

alternative plans to construct an office building on top of the existing
structure. 63 The Commission rejected both plans; 64 Penn Central did

not seek judicial review of these decisions, which was available
pursuant to the Landmark Law. 65 Instead, Penn Central chose to file
suit in state court alleging a 'taking' without just compensation in
violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, seeking injunctive
and declaratory relief to prohibit the enforcement of the Landmark
Law, as well as damages for the "temporary taking." 66

improvements. Id. at § 207-4.0 to § 207-9.0.
In order to alter a designated landmark property, the landowner may:
(1) apply to the Commission for a "certificate of no effect on protected
architectural features." This determination is subject to judicial review. Id. at § 2075.0.
(2) apply to the Commission for a "certificate of appropriateness." This determination is also subject to judicial review. Id. at § 207-6.0.
(3) apply to the Commission for a "certificate of appropriateness" due to an
"insufficient return" to the landowner on his investment due to the designation as a
landmark. Id. at § 207-8.0.
61. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 1160.

62. Penn Central Transportation Co. sued in conjunction with Union General
Properties, Ltd. (UGP). UGP had a long-term lease agreement with Penn Central in
order to facilitate the construction of the office building and bolster sagging terminal
revenues. All actions attributed to Penn Central for purposes of this article were
jointly undertaken by Penn Central and UGP, including applications to the Commission and the initiation of this suit. Id. at 117.
63. The first plan called for a 55-story office building to be built on top of the
existing structure with no modifications to the existing building or facade. The second
plan called for a 53-story office building to be built on the existing building, but
called fqr stripping the entire existing facade off and replacing it with a "modern
look," as well as some other minor exterior alterations. Id. at 116-119.
64. Id. at 117.
65. Id. at 118. Review could be sought pursuant to N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, ch.
8-A, § 207-1.0 et. seq. (1976). See supra note 60.
66. In the case of a "regulatory taking," the governmental body always has
the power to rescind an ordinance or statute; if the offending ordinance is rescinded,
a "temporary taking" has occurred during the time in which the ordinance was
effectively on the books or enforced against the injured property owner.
The fact that a regulatory 'taking' may be temporary, by virtue of the government's power to rescind or amend the regulation, does not make it any less
of a constitutional 'taking.' Nothing in the just compensation clause suggests
that 'takings' must be permanent and irrevocable. Nor does the temporary
reversible quality of a regulatory 'taking' render compensation for the time
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The trial court granted Penn Central's request for injunctive and
declaratory relief, but declined to award damages. 67 The New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed, holding that there could
only be a taking when the ordinance deprived Penn Central of "all
beneficial use" of the property. 68 The New York Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that there was no "taking" in this case, as the City
had not appropriated control of the property for public use. 69 The

Court also found that no fourteenth amendment due process clause

70
violation had occurred.
The importance of the Penn Central decision, for present purposes, is twofold. First, the Court recognized that a "regulatory
taking" may occur. "In deciding whether a particulargovernmental
action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the
character of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference
with rights in the parcel as a whole. '71 The Court also suggested, by
way of a disclaimer, that it did not "embrace the proposition that a
'taking' can never occur unless government has transferred physical

control over a portion of a parcel." '7 2 Second, the Court outlined a
basic test for making a determination of whether a taking has occurred. The Court identifies

several factors, that have particular significance. The economic

impact of the regulation on the claimant, and particularly, the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
of the 'taking' any less obligatory.

San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 658 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan's view that a recognized "temporary taking" must be compensated has just recently been recognized in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987). See also Berger &
Kanner, Thoughts on the White River Junction Manifesto: A Reply to the "Gang of
Five's" Views on Just Compensation for Regulatory Taking of Property, 19 Loy.
L.A.L. REV. 685 (1986).
However, this is not a universally held idea. But see, e.g., Babcock, Mandelker,
Siemon, Smith & Williams, The White River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REv. 193
(1984).
67. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 120.
68. Id. at 120-121.
69. Id. at 1 1-123.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 130-31 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at. 123 n.25. As late as 1958, in United States v. Central Eureka Mining
Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958), the Supreme Court was still using language which suggested
that a "physical invasion" of land was a necessary prerequisite to recovery for a
"taking." Id. at 158.
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investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental
action. A "taking" may more readily be found when the
interference with property can be characterized as a physical
invasion by government, than when interference arises from
some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good.73
While the Court in Penn Central did adhere to the proposition
that taking cases should be dealt with on an ad hoc basis, 74 and while
the Court did set out the three-part test identifying several factors
which may be particularly relevant in determining whether a taking
has occurred," one major analytical flaw in the Court's reasoning
merits attention.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, repeats Justice Holmes'
oft-quoted admonition that "[g]overnment hardly could go on if to
some extent values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every such change in the general law." ,76 The Court
then recognized a number of situations where economic values would
be "adversely affected," and no fifth amendment violation would
necessarily follow. 77 However, the Court's inclusion of a "health,
safety, morals, or general welfare" example,7 8 citing to cases which
were all decided under the due process/police power component of
the fourteenth amendment, 79 seems misplaced in a fifth amendment
analysis. There is no explanation of the fifth/fourteenth amendment
link (or how a fourteenth amendment issue is "transmuted" into a
fifth amendment issue), nor is there any recognition of the fourteenth

73. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.

74. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
75. Id.

76. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
77. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. The Court specifically mentions the power
to tax, situations where "the challenged government action caused economic harm,
[but] it did not interfere with interests that were sufficiently bound up with the
reasonable expectations of the claimant to constitute 'property' for Fifth Amendment
purposes," and situations where the promotion of "health, safety, morals, or general
welfare" outweighed the destroyed or adversely affected property interest. Id. at 124-

25.

78. Id. at 125.
79. Id. at 125, citing Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927);
Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592-93
(1962).
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80
amendment police power component in the Court's three-part test.

B.

ANDRUS v. ALLARD"I

While not a land use case, Andrus appears to have been the first
opportunity for the Court to apply the Penn Central test. 2 The fact
that there appears to have been a 100 percent diminution-of-value
also makes this case interesting and instructive.
The facts of Andrus involved a federal statute prohibiting certain
uses of bald or golden eagles.8 3 Allard was convicted for violating the
federal act by selling Indian artifacts comprised partly of eagle feathers
84
which had been obtained prior to the effective date of the statute.
Andrus contended, among other things, that if the statute was valid
as to "pre-existing" artifacts, there was an unconstitutional taking of
private property without just compensation." The Supreme Court
disagreed, holding that because the owners of the artifacts still had
certain rights, notably the rights to "possess and transport their
property, and to donate or devise the protected birds," there was no
taking.8 6 In support of this conclusion, the Court stated that "[a]t
least where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the
destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle 87is not a taking, because the
aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.9
This case is instructive for two reasons: (1) the Court held that
what practically amounted to a 100 percent deprivation did not
constitute a taking; and (2) the Court continued to recognize the
principle that the "bundle" of property rights would be looked at as
80. While the third part of the test, providing for consideration of the "character of the governmental action," may arguably provide the fourteenth amendment
component, this refers more to the type of action (physical invasion versus regulatory
invasion) and not the relative weight of the action as an exercise of the police power.

81. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
82. Id.at 65.
83. Id.at 52-54. The statute made it illegal to "take, possess, sell, purchase,
barter, offer to sell, purchase or barter, transport, export or import" any bald or
golden eagle, eagle nest or eagle egg. 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (1983). The Migratory Bird
Treaty Act provided similar restrictions. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1983).
84. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 53-55.
85. Id. at 64.

86. Id. at 66.

87. Id.at 65-66. With respect to the argument that the regulations denied
Allard an opportunity to earn a profit from his property, the Court noted that Allard
still retained the ability to "exhibit the artifacts for an admissions charge." Id. at
66.
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an entity for fifth amendment purposes."8 In this case, some of the
"bundle" remained with the owners.8 9
Under a straight-forward reading of the fifth amendment just
compensation clause, a property right cannot be effectively extinguished, as was done in Andrus, without making application of the
amendment almost farcical. As in Penn Central, the need to incorporate the fourteenth amendment police power/due process component is essential to any constitutionally consistent analysis. 90
C.

AGINS v. CITY OF TIBURON'

In Agins, the landowners purchased five acres of unimproved

land for residential development. Thereafter, the City of Tiburon
adopted zoning ordinances 92 pursuant to state law requiring preparation of a general zoning plan to deal with land use and open-space
development. 93 As a result of the adopted ordinance, the Agins' land
was limited by density restrictions allowing for residential construction
of only one to five single-family residences on the entire five-acre
parcel. 94 The Agins did not submit development plans to the City of
Tiburon, but rather filed suit seeking declaratory relief and damages. 95
The suit centered on the Agins' claim that their property had been
"taken" without just compensation in violation of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments.
88. Id. at 65-66. See also Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978); Keystone Bituminous coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
107 S. Ct. 1232, 1249-51 (1987).
89. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66. It is important to note, however, that the continuing
validity of the rule that the "bundle of sticks" is inseparable for fifth amendment
purposes is questionable. See Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987), where the
Court held that the abrogation of one right of ownership, the right to devise the
property in question, did constitute a fifth amendment taking. In a concurrence
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Powell, Justice Scalia stated:
I write separately to note that in my view the present statute, insofar as it
concerns the balance between rights taken and rights left untouched, is
indistinguishable from the statute that was at issue in Andrus v. Allard.
Because that comparison is determinative of whether there a taking, in
finding a taking today, our decision effectively limits Allard to its facts.
Id. at 2084-85.
90. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
91. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
92. TiBuRoN, CAL., ORDINANCES Nos. 123 N.S. and 124 N.S. (June 28, 1979).
93. CAL. Gov'T. CODE ANN. §§ 65302(a) and 65302(e) (West Supp. 1979); See
also id. § 65563.
94. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
95. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 271-72, 598 P.2d 25, 27, 157
Cal. Rptr. 372, 374 (1979), aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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The California Supreme Court held that a landowner who challenges the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance may not "sue in
inverse condemnation and thereby transmute an excessive use of the
police power into lawful taking for which compensation in eminent
domain must be paid." ' 96 In other words, the court held that where
there is an excessive or wrongful use of the state's police power (given
to a municipality through an enabling ordinance), any corrective
action by a landowner to correct that wrong must be to invalidate the
excessive use of the police power. No cause of action could be
maintained in order to "transmute" a wrongful police power action
into a lawful eminent domain proceeding. In accordance with the first
finding, the California Supreme Court also held that the only remedies
taking" case are mandamus
available to landowners in a "regulatory
97
or declaratory and injunctive relief.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Agins decision
and held that the zoning ordinances, on their face, did not constitute
a "taking" without just compensation.98 However, the Court refused
to address the California Supreme Court's determination that mandamus or declaratory and injunctive relief are the only available
remedies in inverse condemnation proceedings. Instead, the Court
held that where there was no "taking," the question of available
remedies need not be considered. 99
The Court came close to advancing a general test when it suggested that "[t]he application of a general zoning law to a particular
property affects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests, or denies an owner economically
viable use of his land."' ' Immediately following this statement,
however, the Court states that "no precise rule determines when
property has been taken."11
The general test suggested above, put in the context of the two
potential analyses available in a regulatory taking case, provides one
test which addresses the due process concern (government action must
"substantially advance legitimate state interests"); and another test
which addresses the takings concern (government action cannot "den[y]
an owner economically viable use of his land"). 0 2 While the Court in
96. Id. at 273, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
97. Id. at 273-274, 598 P.2d at 28-29, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375-76.

98. Agins, 447 U.S. at 259.

99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

263.
260 (citations omitted).
260-261.
260.
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Agins may have addressed both parts of the taking analysis, there
does not appear to be any indication as to how these two parts should
be balanced, and how much weight should be attributed to each.
However, in 1981, at least one critical issue had been clarified to
some extent-the Court seems to have resolved the issue of whether
a regulatory taking could ever occur. 03
D.

FIRST ENGLISH EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH OF GLENDALE
v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES04

While the First English Church case has not really added to the
jurisprudence on how to determine when a taking has occurred, the
Court's discussion on takings and the proper remedies for fifth
amendment violations is sufficiently related and important to justify
some extended treatment.
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale owned
property on which it operated "Lutherglen," a retreat for handicapped children. In 1977, a forest fire upstream from Lutherglen
denuded the trees, creating a "serious flood hazard."'' 5 In 1978, a
serious flood occurred and the buildings on Lutherglen were destroyed. The County of Los Angeles responded by passing an interim
flood control ordinance prohibiting construction, or reconstruction,
of any building or structure in an area which included Lutherglen." 0°
The church filed a complaint in California state court alleging, inter
alia, a taking of property by denying all use of Lutherglen. 10 7
This case never reaches the issue of whether the interim ordinance
in this case actually denies the church all use of its property-i.e.,
whether there is a fifth amendment taking. 10 However, the Court
does address the problem of what damages are appropriate when
there is a regulatory taking. The majority concludes that money
damages are the appropriate remedy, and that the damages must be
calculated beginning at the effective date of any ordinance or regu103. See supra notes 85,86 and accompanying text.
104. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
105. Id. at 2381.
106. Id. at 2381-82.
107. Id. at 2382. The trial court granted the County's motion to "strike the
allegation that the church had been denied all use of Lutherglen." Id. This was done
based on the trial court's reading of Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25,
157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979). FirstEnglish Church, 107 S. Ct. at 2382. Eventually, the
trial court granted a non-suit and dismissed the entire complaint. Id. at 2382 n.2.
108. First English Church, 107 S. Ct. at 2384-85. The Court remanded the case
to the state courts to answer this question.
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lation which effects a taking. 1°9 The Court's holding stated that
"where the government's activities have already worked a taking of
all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can
relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during
which the taking was effective."' 0 There can be no doubt after First
English Church that a regulatory action which works a taking must
comport with the just compensation dictates of the fifth amendment.
While that proposition is clear, the Court continued to muddy
the waters of taking jurisprudence"' by stating that the "county might
avoid the conclusion that a compensable taking had occurred by
establishing that the denial of all use was insulated as a part of the
2
State's authority to enact safety regulations.""
This infusion of police power/due process language into the fifth
amendment analysis, or more accurately, this infusion of the fifth
amendment into a proper police power/due process analysis, again
highlights the need to find some constitutionally consistent, practically
applicable, and comprehensive analytical framework within which
regulatory taking cases can be decided.
Before looking at this Comment's recommended alternative, it
will be useful to construct the elements of the current federal "regulatory takings" analysis.
III.

THE CURRENT FEDERAL TEST FOR REGULATORY

TAKINGS

There seem to be three major steps in the current federal analysis.
The first determination is a threshold question about whether the
challenged regulation is a legitimate use of the police power under a
substantive due process analysis." 3 The second determination has been
characterized in various Supreme Court opinions using differing language-this step asks whether the challenged regulation denies a
property owner "reasonable investment-backed expectations,"" 4 denies an owner "economically viable use of his land""' 5 or "completely
109. Id. at 2389.
110. Id.

111. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
112. First English Church, 107 S. Ct. at 2384-85 (emphasis added), citing

Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 17-39.
114. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124

(1978). See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.

115. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,

accompanying note 100.

260 (1980).

See supra text
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deprive[s] the owner of all or most of his interest in the property." '11 6
If the answer to this inquiry is negative, then the regulation is upheld.
If the answer is affirmative, however, the whole question is transmuted
into a fifth amendment just compensation issue, and the third and
final inquiry is, what remedy will be available to a property owner
whose parcel has been "taken?"
The second and third parts of this test are the most important,
and the most controversial, and warrant further discussion.
A.

DEPRIVATION OF "ALL OR MOST" OF A PARCEL

In describing the second part of the test, Justice Brennan states
in his dissent in San Diego Gas that a regulatory taking is compensable
when "the effects [of the regulation] completely deprive the owner of
all or most of his interest in the property."11 7 A major question which
remains to be answered, then, is what constitutes "all or most" of a
property interest. This same ambiguity is likewise left unexplained in
Penn Central, Agins, and most recently in First English Church. In
1978, in Penn Central,'8 the Court stated that it "quite simply, has
been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice
and fairness require that economic injuries caused by public action be
compensated by the government."1" 9 This inability to fashion any
definitive guidelines for the lower courts is arguably due as much to
the difficulty of constructing a bright-line test' 20 as it is to the desire
to provide enough flexibility in the analysis for the courts to respond
to the particular, localized circumstances and issues in each case. This
Comment recognizes that there are problems which arise because of
these ambiguities. Namely, the lower federal courts are placed in an
awkward position where they have only partial direction; they have
been given a broad standard without any identifiable guidelines or
116. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 654
(1981).
117. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
118. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
119. Id. at 124. See also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594
(1962) ("there is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking
begins. Although a comparison before and after is relevant, [citations], it is by no
means conclusive . . ."); United States v. Clatex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952)
("No rigid rules can be laid down to distinguish compensable losses from noncompensable losses. Each case must be judged on its own facts."); Girard, Constitutional Takings Clauses and the Regulation of Private Property: Part , 34 LAND
UsE L. DIG. 4 (vol. 10 1982).
120. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 654
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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helpful explanatory information for determining what "all or most"
means in terms of a property owner's interest, or how that private
interest should be balanced against the state's interest.
It is exactly this problem-the practical difficulty of fashioning
a bright-line test which is also sufficiently flexible-which supports
the inevitable conclusion that rigid guidelines are not the answer to
2
the problems of the past.' '
There are other elements which must be factored into the regulatory taking equation before a workable alternative can be suggested.
There are at least three major public policy concerns at work which
must be recognized. The first underlying policy concern revolves
around the practical "chilling" effect of allowing monetary compensation in "regulatory takings" cases.' 22 A second policy concern deals
with a municipality's police power right to protect the health, safety,
morals, and general welfare of the community. A third concern at
work is the judicial necessity to protect property owners and developers from governmental entities which abuse or overreach their police
power authority. The approach which the Court adopts in "regulatory
taking" cases should address not only the constitutional issues, but
also these public policy concerns.' 23 The Court's most recent regulatory
taking cases have not done so.
B.

REMEDIES

The remedies which have been used historically in taking cases,
in varying combinations, include mandamus, simple invalidation,
injunctive and declaratory relief, and money damages. The First
English Church case, however, seems to have clarified the point. First
English Church states that 'temporary' takings which . . . deny a
landowner all use of his property, are not different in kind from
permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation.'124
121. See infra text accompanying notes 128-42. See generally Ross, Modeling
and Formalism in Takings Jurisprudence, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 372 (1986).
122. Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 631 F. Supp. 181 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (jury
awarded $28.5 million against a municipality).
123. It seems reasonable to conclude that once it is established that a municipality
will be liable for money damages for an offensive land-use regulation, local govern-

ment officials will certainly shy away from even the most innocuous ordinances for
fear of financial ruin for the governmental entity. While that circumstance may be
welcomed by developers and property owners, it does not take into account the
traditional police powers reserved to the states.
124. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
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The difficulty with this remedial approach is not that monetary
compensation is awarded; rather, the problem arises because the
compensation which is awarded under the fifth amendment just
compensation clause must be fair market value, regardless of the
circumstances. This remedial approach fails to address the abovementioned policy concerns of both the municipality and the property
owner. For example, a perfectly well-intentioned city may err by
simply venturing too close to an imaginary line which the Court
admittedly has been unable to delineate with any degree of certainty.12
Because the remedy of fair market value is mandated under the fifth
amendment, this "good-faith" regulatory decision may result in a
multi-million dollar judgment against the municipality. On the other
hand, a property owner who has been subjected to malicious or
purposeful regulatory action by a municipality Would likewise receive
fair market value with no possibility of an award which included
punitive damages, attorney's fees, lost profits, and the like. 26 The
practical ramifications of this rigid approach are clearly pointed out
in Justice Stevens' dissent in First English Church.' 21

IV.

A RECOMMENDED WORKABLE BALANCING TEST

This Comment has shown that it is historically accurate to adopt
the "metaphorical" view of Justice Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania
Coal. 2 In addition, the statements of Chief Justice Rehnquist in First
English Church suggest a need to incorporate and balance a due
process component into the regulatory taking analysis. 29 Lastly, this
article has suggested there are public policy concerns which should be
addressed in any workable analysis.130
This Comment proposes an alternative to the two approaches
which the Court has used. This recommendation is really a modified
version of an older, more traditional approach to this modern probAngeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2388 (1987) citing San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City
of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 657 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Nothing inthe
Just Compensation Clause suggests that 'takings' must be permanent and-irrevocable").
125. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
126. "Prediction of profitability is essentially a matter of reasoned speculation
that courts are not especially competent to perform." Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S.
51, 66 (1979).
127. First English Church, 107 S.Ct. at 2398-2400 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
129. See First English Church, 107 S.Ct. at 2384-85.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 122-23.
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lem. While the suggested alternative is not in the mainstream of land
use jurisprudence in the 1980's, it has modern justifications which
support its adoption today. The takings issue should be returned to
its status as a police power/substantive due process question.", The
courts should then proceed to a hybrid of the traditional due process
analysis and the current fifth amendment analysis to address takings
cases.
As described earlier, this traditional analysis involves a relatively
liberal look at whether the governmental action is reasonably related2
to the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the community.1
This comment's recommended approach begins with the same threshold inquiry regarding the objectives of the regulatory action. Presumably, most governmental regulation would have little trouble meeting
this threshold requirement. This is especially true in light of the
breadth of the Court's language describing the legitimate goals of
33
land use regulations in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas:
[a] quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor
vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project
addressed to family needs. This goal is a permissible one
within Berman v. Parker... The police power is not confined
to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is
ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and
the blessings of quiet seculsion and clear air make the area a
34
sanctuary for people. 1
Currently, a court's next step considers whether the regulatory
135
action takes "all or most of [the] interest" in the regulated parcel,
i.e., that the regulation would constitute a taking under the current
fifth amendment analysis.3 6 Currently, the inquiry ends here except
for the factual determination of "fair market value" as compensation,
should the interference be substantial enough.
The constitutional inquiry should instead remain focused on the
substantive due process analysis. If a court finds the objectives of a
131. See supra notes 17-39 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
133. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
134. Id. at 9.
135. The other phrases which have been described previously can be used
interchangeably. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text. While the use of
one particular phrase over another may have unique nuances, the idea for present
purposes is that at this stage in the analysis it must be determined that the property
deprivation is substantial.
136. See supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
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regulatory action acceptable, it should then consider whether the party
challenging the validity of the regulatory action has shown that the
regulation results in a taking of "all or an essential use" of the
property in question.1 7 This stage of the analysis addresses the
necessity for governmental flexibility in fashioning laws to protect the
public health, safety, morals and general welfare. 31
If the plaintiff successfully carries the burden of showing that all
or an essential use of the property has been taken by the regulation,
the burden should then shift to the defendant municipality (or other
government entity) to show that the regulation was necessary to
protect some important governmental interest which must rise to a
higher level than merely the health, safety, morals or general welfare
of the community; and that the regulation was a rational means
employed to accomplish that important governmental interest. This
final stage of the analysis is necessary to address the concern of
overreaching governmental intrusion on private property rights. This
final prong also indirectly addresses the concern over potentially huge
financial liability for municipalities and the attendant "chilling" effect
on local regulatory action. The ability of a municipality to justify an
admittedly extreme intrusion may lessen the liability exposure for local
government and eliminate the "chill" on regulatory actions which
serve an important governmental interest. In addition, it seems consistent with the language in Lutheran Church.3 9
The final question which arises concerns the remedies which will
be available to a wronged property owner. This article has criticized
the application of a rigid and mechanical "fair market value" test.4o
The constitutional and policy questions discussed above have been
answered with an analysis which balances the equities of the parties.
The final issue of remedies should likewise sound in equity.
A flexible remedial approach can be found in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983 states that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the juris137. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
139. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2384-85 (1987) (an otherwise compensable taking may be
"insulated as a part of the State's authority to enact safety regulations.").
140. See supra notes 131-42 and accompanying text.
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diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
4
or other proper proceeding for redress.1 1
A § 1983 action allows a property owner to bring a suit in equity in
federal court for a deprivation of due process under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. This approach would allow a court to look
at additional factors other than "fair market value" in determining a
damage award.
On one hand, the courts may look at the good faith of the
municipality, or the harm or detriment to the property owner in
mitigating a municipality's liability; on the other hand, the courts
may look at the degree of maliciousness or capriciousness of a
municipality, or even lost profits, to increase a potential damage
award. In addition, at the discretion of the court, reasonable attorney's fees may be provided to the prevailing party in the action under
42 U.S.C. § 1988.142
As a practical matter, a suit for compensation would be filed
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the analysis which has been outlined
above would be used to determine whether there had been a "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." If it is determined that a due process violation has
occurred, compensation would be calculated by the trier of fact based
on the particular circumstances and exigencies of each case.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Comment begins by suggesting that the Court's most recent
attempt at a sound analysis for regulatory takings falls short due to
its failure to adequately account for the "State's authority to enact
safety regulations," and to allow for a meaningful balancing of the
public and private interests involved. In addition, the Comment points
out that (1) the need for flexibility in determining what "all or most"
of a parcel is; (2) various public policy concerns; and (3) the need for
flexibility in fashioning remedies, must all be taken into account in
building an analytical model for regulatory takings.
The conclusion this Comment reaches is that a modified substantive due process model would best serve these various constitutional
and practical elements. This due process model begins with a threshold
141. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1981).
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141

inquiry into whether the regulation is "clearly arbitrary or unreasonable"-insuring that the regulation is rationally related to the "health,
safety, morals and general welfare" of the community. The model
then asks whether the regulation takes "all or most" of the landowner's interest in the subject property. If the answer is affirmative, the
burden should then shift to the state to show that the regulation
serves an important government interest, and that the regulation is a
rational means to accomplish the goal. Finally, any damages would
sound in equity based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Steven L Brody

